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INTRODUCTION

Mergers alter industry structure so as to give merged entities
increased market power.' Unfortunately, the merged entity uses its
enhanced market power to raise prices and profits at the expense of
consumers. 2 Mergers, however, may create efficiencies that enhance
consumer wealth. Since the net effect of mergers on consumer welfare
is ambiguous, regulatory authorities will generally challenge any proposed merger which may be anticompetitive.3 Focusing upon horizontal mergers 4 in the hospital industry, and the unique characteristics
of the health care market, this article examines whether hospital mergers should receive special treatment.
Section II explains antitrust policy by examining the case against
monopoly, the legislative background, and the standards for horizontal
mergers. Section III examines the economics of mergers by describing
the effects on both allocative and productive efficiency and the motives
for horizontal mergers. Section IV develops the relationship between
hospital mergers and efficiency by emphasizing the peculiarities of
health care markets and the effect of nonprofit hospitals. Section V
analyzes the antitrust treatment of hospital mergers by looking at
both judicial and Department of Justice approaches to product and
geographic market definition and to their analyses of anticompetitive
effects.

1. For a general discussion of market power in an antitrust context, see Landes & Posner,
Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1981).

2.

For a provocative analysis, see Stigler, Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger, 40 AM.

ECON. REV. 23 (1950).

3. Under § 7A(a) of the Clayton Act, the merging parties must notify the Federal Trade
Commission and/or the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice of their intentions.
Clayton Act § 7A(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1890 (West 1988). They must also provide information that
will permit the reviewer to evaluate the probable competitive consequences of the merger. Id.
See Choate, Higgins & McChesney, Bureaucracy and Politics in FTC Merger Challenges (May
1988) (unpublished manuscript) (analyzing merger enforcement policy at the Federal Trade
Commission).
4. A horizontal merger is a merger between two firms that compete with one another in
the same line of business. This article discusses mergers of hospitals that provide the same
array of services. Thus, this article does not describe a merger between a general acute care
hospital and a specialty hospital.
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II.

ANTITRUST BACKGROUNDs

A.

The Case Against Monopoly

Antitrust policy flows directly from the case against monopoly,
demonstrated in Figure 1. Consider the price and output of a competitively organized industry. The horizontal 6 line labelled S represents

FIGURE 1
PRICE AND COST

QUANTITY

5.

For interesting historical accounts, see generally W.
(1965); H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL

POLICY IN AMERICA

LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC
ANTITRUST POLICY

(1954). For

a discussion of revisionist accounts of the economic history of the period, see Scheiber, Public
Economic Policy and the American Legal System: Historical Perspectives, 1980 Wis. L. REV.
1159.
6. Competitive industry supply is horizontal when all firms in the industry are basically
the same, and input prices are unaffected by changes in industry demand. See R. BLAIR & L.
KENNY, MICROECONOMICS WITH BUSINESS APPLICATIONS

217-23 (1987).
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the long-run supply curve, while D represents consumer demand. Competitive equilibrium occurs where supply equals demand, or where S
intersects D. Thus, the competitive price and output are P1 and Q1,
respectively. At this price and output, firms in the industry earn just
enough profit to keep their resources employed in this particular industry. The equilibrium demonstrates that any consumer who is willing
to pay the cost to society of an additional unit of output can buy that
extra unit of output.
Contrast this competitive price and output with the equilibrium
price and output under a monopoly. If this industry were under the
control of a single firm, the long-run supply curve (S in Figure 1)
would represent the marginal and average cost curves for that firm.
Instead of having many separate firms under individual ownership
and control, a single firm would have many separate plants or production facilities under common control. Under this industry organization,
the equilibrium output and price are substantially different.7 The
monopolist will equate its marginal costs to its marginal revenue (MR
in Figure 1) to determine the profit-maximizing output, which then
determines the profit-maximizing price. In Figure 1, the monopolist's
profit-maximizing price and output are P 2 and Q2 , respectively.
Figure 1 reveals that the equilibrium output decreases from the
competitive optimum of Q1 to the monopolistic optimum of Q2 , while
price rises from P 1 to P 2 . The monopolist earns excess" profit of
(P2-P1 ) Q2, which is represented by the rectangular area P 2 ABP 1 .
This excess profit, paid by consumers who continue to buy this product
in spite of the higher price, is a transfer from consumers to the producer. Economists do not object to this transfer within society. Instead, their main objection to monopoly stems from the monopolistic
misallocation of resources, demonstrated by output Q2 in Figure 1.
When output equals Q2, the marginal value of the output equals the
price, P 2 . The marginal value to society of the resources used to
produce Q2 , as measured by the marginal cost function, is only P 1.
Thus, the monopolist has refused to produce an extra unit of output
even though consumers are willing to pay more than the cost to society
of an extra unit of output. The triangle ABC represents the welfare
cost of the monopolistic restriction of output, which is the social welfare
loss. 9
7. For a thorough treatment of monopoly, see id. at 253-305.
8. The term "excess" is not used pejoratively. These are profits that are greater than those
necessary to keep the firm's resources employed in this industry.
9. The social welfare loss due to monopoly can be traced to the pioneering work of Hotelling,
The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates,
6 ECONOMETRICA 242 (1938).
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B.

Conditions Conducive to Antitrust Legislation
1. Growth of Combinations

Antitrust laws arose out of the economic and political climate of
the late nineteenth century, aided by the economic theory of monopoly.
The monopolies of that time both reduced efficiency and transferred
wealth from consumers to producers. The consolidation of industry in
the late nineteenth century disturbed Congress more than impairment
10
of economic efficiency.
At the end of the Civil War, the U.S. economy was competitively
structured. Although few industries were heavily concentrated at that
time, the growth of industrial combinations threatened the viability
of competition in many sectors. Toward the end of the nineteenth
century, increasing numbers of industries, including petroleum, railroads, iron and steel, whiskey, cottonseed oil, oatmeal milling, coal,
lumber, ice, beer, meat packing, and tile, organized restraints of
trade." Restraints on competition became pervasive.12
Firms devised increasingly effective restraints on competition. Initially, they relied on simple price fixing agreements under which all
firms agreed to charge the same price.13 These agreements were usually short-lived because each participant had an incentive to cheat on
the agreement. Monopolists replaced unstable price fixing agreements
with the more structured pool. Participants pooled their production
or sales and then redistributed the profits according to some agreed
upon formula. 4 Pooling reduced, but did not eliminate, the incentive
to cheat. When competition undermined the pools, monopolists organized trusts. The industrial trust was a cohesive group 6f firms
under central management. Trusts emerged in petroleum, cottonseed
oil, linseed oil, sugar, whiskey, and lead. 15 These trusts extended
control over the industry in order to obtain monopoly prices and profits.
10. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982).
11. For an extensive history of the development of trade restraints in various American
industries in the last quarter of the 19th century, see H. THORELLI, supra note 5.
12. For a description of the economic, social and political factors that encouraged the growth
of collusive trading practices in the 1870-1880s, see H. THORELLI, supra note 5, at 66-72.
13. Id. at 77.
14. For an analysis of how pools or joint selling agencies can facilitate cartel activities, see
Stigler, The Economic Effects of the Antitrust Laws, 9 J.L. & ECON. 225 (1966).
15. The Standard Oil Trust served as the model for trusts in other industries. Details of
this agreement became public through New York Senate and U.S. House of Representatives
trust investigations in 1888. H. Rep. No. 3112, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888) [hereinafter Proceedings in Relation to Trusts]. Cottonseed Oil trusts were subject to litigation in Louisiana and
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Agrarian Discontent

Following the Civil War, an agricultural depression caused severe
discontent among farmers who believed that all non-farm sectors of
the economy were conspiring against them. 16 The railroads, facing
little competition, charged all that the traffic would bear. The
operators of grain elevators, enjoying local monopolies, charged high
prices. Insulated from competition by protective tariffs, farm equipment dealers also charged high prices. In taxing the farmers' real
property, even the government seemed to conspire against the farmer.
While farmers faced high costs and taxes, farm products generally
commanded low prices in depressed markets.
The farmers blamed monopolies and trusts as the cause of the low
agricultural prices, the high farm equipment prices, and the high,
discriminatory railroad and grain elevator charges. Large farm populations formed political pressure groups like the National Grange to
promote their interests and obtain state legislation that would protect
the farmer. 17 These pressure groups forced the legislators from the
agricultural states to address farmers' distrust of monopolies.
3.

Behavior of Big Business

Discontent among farmers was coupled with generally adverse public sentiment towards big business because of a steady revelation of
offensive business practices.' 8 Predatory practices dominated a few
large and highly visible industries like the petroleum industry. Standard Oil which used independent refiners to force real independents
out of business provided an unsavory role model. 19 Standard Oil enTennessee. State v. American Cotton Oil Trust, 40 LA. ANN. 8 (1888); Mallory v. Hanaur Oil
Works, 86 Tenn. 598 (1888). The National Linseed Oil Trust was organized in 1885, followed
in 1887 by the Sugar Trust (the Sugar Refineries Company) and the Whiskey Trust (the Distillers'
and Cattle Feeders Company). The Sugar Trust controlled about 70% of the national production.
U.S. Industrial Commissions Reports, vol. I, pt. 2, at 109. The Whiskey Trust agreement
compiling is reproduced in House Records. H. Rep. No. 4165, 50th Cong., 2d Sess. (1889). The
National Land Trust was one of the last trusts formed sometime between 1887-1889. For a brief
summary of the development of these trusts, see H. THORELLI, supra note 5, at 72-85.
16. See THORELLI, supra note 5, at 58-62 (explaining the sources of agrarian discontent
and the development of the Granger movement to control monopolies).
17. The "Granger laws" were a series of anti-monopoly laws passed to regulate railroads
and grain carriers. Illinois was the first state to regulate railroad rates in 1869. Similar acts
were passed by other states, including California, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, and Wisconsin. Id. at 59 n.19.
18. Congressional reports on trust activities made public many of the details of the large
trusts. See, e.g., supra note 15.
19. Standard Oil's unsavory trade practices were made public in legislative investigations,
supra note 15, and widely publicized in I. TARBELL, THE HISTORY OF THE STANDARD OIL
COMPANY

(1904).
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gaged in other unsavory practices which included disparaging its competitors by spreading false rumors about their financial stability and
supply reliability, obtaining secret railroad rebates that disadvantaged
20
its competitors, and allegedly corrupting legislators and judges.
4.

Public Opinion

Against this backdrop of economic and political abuse, public
animosity towards the trusts grew. Hatred and distrust of monopoly
has its origins in the Jeffersonian tradition.21 Monopoly, historically
synonymous with unjustified concentration of economic power, was
usually associated with some barrier to equal opportunity. = In the
United States, state statutes prohibiting any grant of monopoly manifested the public distrust. In the final years before passage of the
Sherman Act, objections to the trust included allegations that trusts
did the following: corrupted public employees and legislators, thereby
threatening political democracy; enjoyed the insulation provided by
protective tariffs; hurt consumers by charging higher prices; engaged
in questionable financial practices, such as watering stock; and caused
serious dislocations by suddenly closing plants.- The American public,
feeling abused by the trusts, sought to legislatively curtail the trusts'
power. Any law to prohibit the worst abuses of the most visible trusts
would have sufficed. The Sherman Act was the result.
C.

The Sherman Antitrust Act

The Sherman Act, passed in 1890, is the foundation of current
United States antitrust policy. Its main provisions are contained in
sections 1 and 2:
Section 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby
declared to be illegal.

20. See H. THORELLI, supra note 5, at 91-96 (brief history of Standard Oil with references
to primary sources supporting allegations of improper conduct).
21. While Thorelli adheres to the Progressive framework of historical analysis that emphasizes the conflict between Hamiltonians and Jeffersonians and the rise of special interests
at the expense of public welfare, the "New Legal History," heavily influenced by the legal
realism of J. Willard Hurst, has challenged the assumptions underlying the Progressive interpretation. For a collection of readings explaining this new legal history, see K. HALL, THE LAW
OF BUSINESS AND COMMERCE (1980).

22.
23.

H. THORELLI, supra note 5, at 227.
Id. at 108-60.
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Section 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person
or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony . . . .
The vague and general prohibition of trade restraints and monopolization constituted little more than a legislative command that the
judiciary develop a common law of antitrust. For example, the statute
contains no definition of what constitutes a "restraint of trade." This
legal term of art, which had no universally recognized meaning in
1890, gained its current meaning through a series of antitrust judicial
decisions. 25 The Sherman Act provided a statutory foundation upon
which the judiciary could develop a federal common law of trade restraints.26 As Hovenkamp points out, "the Sherman Act can be regarded as 'enabling' legislation - an invitation to the federal courts
to learn how businesses and markets work and formulate a set of
''27
rules that will make them work in socially efficient ways.
Commentators expressed immediate dissatisfaction with the Sherman Act, in spite of the fact that the early decisions promoted consumer welfare.- The vague and general language of the Sherman Act
failed to draw a sharp line between legal and illegal business practices.
Critics complained that the Sherman Act exposed business executives
to uncertain risks of prosecution.- Those distrustful of the judiciary
were alarmed at the amount of judicial discretion involved in interpreting such a statute as vaguely worded as the Sherman Act. Congress

24. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-2 (West 1988).
25. A. NEAL & D. GOYDER, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 22 (3d ed. 1980).
26. For a recent criticism of the judicial activism that this engendered, see Arthur, Farewell
to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the ConstitutionalSherman Act, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 263 (1986);
see also H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 228 (1954) (asserting that the
Sherman Act was supposed to be a federal codification of the common law of England and the
several states). Congress recognized, however, that the common law was not perfectly clear
and that it contained some ambiguities, which would become clearer with subsequent decisions.
27. H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 52 (1985).
28. Initially, the chief impediment to an effective antitrust policy was the negative attitude
of the courts. See, e.g., United States v. Knight, 156 U.S. 1 (1894) (the Sherman Act prohibits
restraints upon trade and commerce only, not manufacture). This restrictive interpretation was
overturned in subsequent Supreme Court rulings. See, e.g., Northern Securities Co. v. United
States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
29. While the Sixth Circuit Court acknowledged the "manifest danger in the administration
of justice according to so shifting, vague and indeterminate a standard," the Supreme Court
freely developed its own standard in the ancillary restraint doctrine, enforcing only those covenants in restraint of trade which are ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract. United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 284 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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did not respond to the demand for greater specificity until after the
Supreme Court's decision in Standard Oil Co. v. United States30 In
Standard Oil, the Court clearly stated that the Sherman Act had to
be enforced according to the "rule of reason."' ' The Court interpreted
the broad language of the statute as requiring the judiciary to exercise
judgment.- Since the Sherman Act prohibited only unreasonable restraints of trade, courts had discretion to determine whether any
particular contract unduly restrained free competition.
The rule of reason confirmed the worst fears of many opponents
of the Sherman Act who were wary of judicial discretion. Some groups
continued to push for absolute prohibitions of certain business practices, while others were more inclined toward unbridled laissez-faire.
The final result was compromise legislation, which was supposed to
provide some specificity: the Clayton Act.
D.

The Clayton Act

In 1914, Congress passed the Clayton Act which addressed specific
business practices believed to foster monopolies. The Clayton Act
includes a proviso that the business practices it addressed were illegal
only if their effect was to substantially decrease competition or to
create a monopoly. Among other things, the Clayton Act deals with
mergers.- Economic history teaches us that some of our largest firms
like Standard Oil, U.S. Steel, and General Motors were the products
of mergers or acquisitions.
Once the market structure in an industry reaches monopoly or
near-monopoly status, section 2 of the Sherman Act applies. While
section 2 of the Sherman Act attempts to remedy market structure
problems, section 7 of the Clayton Act provides some preventive measures. 35 Section 7 forbids any merger which might substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly. As amended by the CellerKefauver Act, section 7 of the Clayton Act provides
[t]hat no person engaged in commerce or in any activity
affecting commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the

30. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
31. Id. at 60.
32. Id. at 63-64.
33. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 12-27 (West 1988).
34. Section 2 of the Clayton Act addresses price discrimination in its many forms. Clayton
Act § 2, 15 U.S.C.A. § 13 (West 1988). Section 3 deals with exclusionary practices such as
tying, exclusive dealing, and territorial restrictions. Id. at § 3, 15 U.S.C.A. § 14.
35. See Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 176 (1955).
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whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no
person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of
another person engaged also in commerce or in any activity
affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in
any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country,
the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.m
The provision is notable for several reasons. First, a plaintiff need
only show that a merger may have the proscribed effect. Since a
plaintiff need not show any actual, adverse competitive impact, section
7 can prevent the market restructuring that is most conducive to
collusive behavior or single firm dominance. Second, as the statute
now reads, section 7 applies equally to horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate mergers. Third, the proscribed effect on competition must
relate to a "line of commerce" in a "section of the country." In other
words, a product market and a geographic market must be defined
in order to evaluate the competitive impact.
E.

Loophole For Nonprofit Firms

A loophole exists in the Clayton Act for mergers of nonprofit hospitals. 37 Section 7 of the Clayton Act applies to nonprofit as well as
for-profit hospitals for stock acquisitions. Parties acquiring assets,
however, are subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). FTC jurisdiction extends to persons, partnerships, and
corporations.- The FTC Act defines "corporation" to include any business entity that is "organized to carry on business for its own profit
or that of its members. '"- Due to the FTC Act's limited definition of
"corporation," the Clayton Act may not cover asset acquisitions involving nonprofit hospitals.
The extent of FTC jurisdiction is not yet defined. In United States
v. Carilion Health System, 40 the Western District Court in Virginia
held that section 7 does not apply to mergers of nonprofit hospitals,
while in United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp.,'41
an Illinois district
36. 15 U.S.C.A. § 18.
37. See Miles, Hospital Mergers and the Antitrust Laws: An Overview, 29 ANTITRUST
BULL. 253 (1984); Singer, Application of Federal Antitrust Law To Mergers of Competing
Hospitals (Nov. 8, 1985) (materials accompanying remarks presented at 19th New England
Antitrust Conference).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 44.
40. 707 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Va. 1989).
41. 717 F. Supp. 1251 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
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court held that section 7 does apply. Both decisions, however, are
being appealed. If the Supreme Court endorses the limited definition
of "corporation" in the FTC Act, the health care industry would largely
escape antitrust scrutiny because the nonprofit hospital is the predominant model of organization in the industry. Consequently, this
42
exemption could apply to a large number of hospital mergers.
F.

Horizontal Merger Standards

The language of section 7 of the Clayton Act imposes some requirements on the judiciary in developing horizontal merger standards. In
determining the legality of a horizontal merger, a court must ascertain
whether the merger will substantially decrease competition or tend
to create a monopoly in any line of commerce in any section of the
country. This analysis requires a clear definition of product market
("line of commerce") and geographic market ("section of the country").
After defining the markets, the court must determine the competitive
significance of the merger. Most of the Supreme Court's standards,
developed by the Warren Court, reflect a hostile attitude toward hori43
zontal mergers.
1. Product Market Definition
Defining the relevant product market is a difficult problem.
Economists usually look at the cross-elasticity of demand to assess
the substitutability of two products,- but the cross-elasticity of demand is difficult to measure. An analyst must rely upon price correlations and purchase patterns as a practical way of drawing inferences
about the cross-elasticity of demand. 4 5 Courts, however, have not relied on such evidence. Historically, the Supreme Court has adopted
whatever product market definition was proposed by the government.
42.

See Blair & Fesmire, Antitrust Treatment of Nonprofit and For-Profit Hospital Mer-

gers, 7 ADVANCES IN HEALTH ECON. & HEALTH SERV. RESEARCH 221 (1986).

43. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 278 (1966) ("It is enough
for us that Congress feared that a [nonprofit] market marked at the same time by both a continuous decline in the number of small businesses and a large number of mergers .... "); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (merger between firms controlling an
"undue percentage" of a market and which results in a "significant increase" in concentration
is inherently likely to lessen competition); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962)
(Court adopts "domino theory" in mergers, believing that approval of one merger now might
require the Court to approve subsequent mergers that would further concentrate the industry).
44. The cross-elasticity of demand equals the percentage change in the quantity of good X
demanded divided by the percentage change in the price of Y. If X and Y are substitutes, the
cross-elasticity should be positive and fairly large.
45. For a discussion of this approach, see R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST
ECONOMICS

106-10 (1985).
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is a particularly egregious

example of the Court's failure to exercise independent judgment. Continental Can, a metal can manufacturer, acquired Hazel Atlas, a glass
jars manufacturer. 47 Although the lower court recognized that metal
and glass containers were separate products, 48 the Court found them

to be competing in some uses. 49 Ignoring reasonable interchangeability
of use and cross elasticity of demand, the Court ruled that the relevant
product market included both metal and glass containers. 50 The majority was not "concerned by the suggestion that if the product market
is to be defined in these terms it must include plastic, paper, foil and
any other materials competing for the same business."'51 This ad hoc
reasoning demonstrates that the Court can manipulate the product
market definition to obtain any desired result in a merger case.52
2. Geographic Market Definition
The analytical tools used to define the relevant product market
also can be applied to defining the relevant geographic market. Not
surprisingly, however, the Supreme Court has failed to articulate a
consistent standard in evaluating geographic markets. For example,
in United States v. Pabst Brewing Co.,5 the Court failed to carefully
define the market. According to the Court, section 7 of the Clayton
Act "requires merely that the Government prove the merger has substantial anticompetitive effect somewhere in the United States." 5 The
Court never defined the relevant geographic market in which the
government must demonstrate an anticompetitive effect.

46. 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
47. Id. at 443.
48. Id. at 448 (citing 217 F. Supp. at 780-81).
49. Id. at 449-52.
50. Id. at 455. Thus, though the interchangeability may not be so complete, and the crosselasticity of demand not so immediate as in the case of most intra-industry mergers, there is,
over the long run, the kind of customer response to innovation and other competitive stimuli
that brings the competition between these two industries within § 7's competition-preserving
provisions.
51. Id. at 457-58.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Rome Cable), 377 U.S. 271 (1964)
(bare and insulated aluminum conductor constitutes one market for the purposes of § 7 because
both are used for conducting electricity and sold to the same customers, but copper and wire
constitutes a separate market).
53. 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
54. Id. at 549.
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3.

Establishing Anticompetitive Effect

The Court measures anticompetitive effect in terms of market
shares. In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States 55 the Court identified
market share as "one of the most important factors to be considered
when determining the probable effects . . . on effective competition
in the relevant market."- In United States v. PhiladelphiaNational
Bank, 57 the Court expressed its conviction that
[a] merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market
is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that
it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing
that the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive
effects.5
Market share theory has several conceptual problems. In theory,
market share is only linked to market power at the extremes of perfect
competition and monopoly. 59 Moreover, the empirical link between
market share and market power is vehemently disputed.60

III.

THE ECONOMICS OF MERGERS

Antitrust policy regarding hospital mergers should reflect the social
and economic goals of antitrust policy. Antitrust law seeks to advance
consumer welfare,61 to equitably distribute economic and political
power,6 to promote small business,- to preserve local control over
55.

370 U.S. 294 (1962).

56.

Id. at 343.

57.

374 U.S. 321 (1963).

58. Id. at 363. This cavalier attitude toward proof of adverse effect was not an isolated
instance. In the Continental Can decision, the Court observed that "[w]here a merger is of
such size as to be inherently suspect, elaborate proof of market structure, market behavior and
probable anticompetitive effects may be dispensed with in view of § 7's design to prevent undue
concentration." 378 U.S. at 458 (1964).
59. See Saving, Concentration Ratios and the Degree of Monopoly, 11 INT'L ECON. REV.
139 (1970).
60. See Weiss, The Concentration-ProfitsRelationshipand Antitrust, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 184 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann & J. Weston eds., 1974);
Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE
NEW LEARNING 164 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann & J. Weston eds., 1974).
61. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. L. & ECON. 7 (1966).
62. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium,66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140,
1152-54 (1981); Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1054
(1979).
63.

Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 384 (1965).
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business,6 to prevent concentrations of industrial power,6 and to encourage entrepreneurial ability.6 The antitrust laws promote economic
efficiency 67 by promoting competition and inhibiting monopolistic behavior. Since monopolies tend to restrict output and raise prices to
consumers, thereby reducing consumer welfare, a reduction in
monopolistic behavior tends to increase efficiency and enhance welfare.
While all these goals have merit, advancing consumer welfare is the
most important goal of antitrust regulation of hospital mergers.
A.

Allocative vs. Productive Efficiency

The earlier examination of monopoly68 focused on allocative inefficiency which results from the monopolistic tendency to restrict output.
But a merger that enhances efficiency is beneficial. Figure 2 illustrates
the potential conflict between allocative and productive efficiency.69
Suppose that competing manufacturers of products propose a merger.
In Figure 2, D is the demand curve for the product, and AC 1 is the
constant average cost and marginal cost curve. 70 Prior to the merger,
competition will drive price to P 1, which equals average cost (AC1 ),
and the competing firms will produce total output equal to the quantity
Q1.71 If the merger results in a significant increase in market power,
then the new, merged firm will be able to raise its price to P2.7

64.
65.

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315-16 (1962).
Comanor, Conglomerate Mergers: Considerationsfor Public Policy, in THE CONGLOMERATE CORPORATION 13-24 (R. Blair & R. Lanzillotti eds. 1981).
66. Blake & Jones, supra note 63, at 384.
67. See generally P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 103-13 (1978); R. BORK,
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX:

A

POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF

50-71 (1978); R.

POSNER ANTI-

8-22 (1976).
68. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
69. See Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM.
ECON. REV. 18 (1968). The text discussion parallels that of R. BORK, supra note 67, at 107-10.
70. If the average cost is constant, then marginal cost (the amount that is added to total
cost when an additional unit is produced) must also be constant and equal to average cost. If
marginal cost were greater than average cost, then an extra unit of production would add more
to total cost than the previous average, and the average would rise. If marginal cost were less
than the previous average, then the extra unit would cause average cost to fall. See supra note
6, at 142-47.
71. Price equal to average cost results in zero economic profit. Zero economic profit, however, means that the firm is earning a normal profit. Economists, interested in resource allocation, include in total cost all payments required to attract and hold resources for the firm. A
normal profit is required to keep the entrepreneur, an important resource, in the business.
When price is equal to average cost, then firms are earning what is called a competitive return
or a normal profit. See id. at 186-187, 217-23.
72. Competitive firms are restricted in their ability to increase price by the existence of
TRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE

many rivals ready to service their customers. Because it eliminates competitors to whom a
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FIGURE 2

PRICE AND COST

AC 2

QUANTITY

The proposed merger, then, may have two results that affect consumer welfare: (1) price may go up and output will fall, reducing
consumer welfare, and (2) the average cost of production may decrease,
thereby enhancing consumer welfare. 71 The net effect on consumers
will depend on the relative size of these welfare effects. The triangular
area A1 represents the loss of consumer welfare due to the merged

firm's customers might turn, a merger may give the firm the ability to raise price with a smaller
loss of sales than would be the case in a more competitive atmosphere.
73. These efficiencies would result from economies associated with large scale production,
promotion or distribution.
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firm's output restriction. The rectangular area A 2 represents the gain
to society resulting from the efficiencies in production achieved by the
merger. After the merger, the new firm produces only Q2 units of
output, but these units, which previously cost AC 1 each, now only
cost AC 2 . Consequently, the merger reduces costs by AC 1-AC 2 for
each unit produced, resulting in a total cost reduction of (AC 1-AC 2 )Q2
which equals the area A 2.7 4 If A1 , the welfare loss associated with the
merged firm's reduced output, is greater than A 2 , the increase in
wealth caused by productive efficiencies, then the merger will reduce
consumer welfare. On the other hand, if A2 is greater than A1 , then
75
the merger will, on balance, increase welfare.
B.

Motives for Mergers

Why do firms merge? Certainly their goal is not to increase consumer welfare. Firms may have many specific motives for a merger.
As profit seekers, firms usually seek to enhance profits. Since profit
is equal to the difference between the firm's total revenue (price of
the product times the quantity sold) and total cost (average cost of
the product times the quantity sold), profits will rise whenever revenues increase, costs decrease, or both. Firms merge either to increase
efficiency, thereby lowering costs and raising profits or to increase
market power, thereby raising revenues and increasing profits. The
consequences for consumer welfare of a proposed merger hinge on
which of these motives dominates.
C.

Merger to Oligopoly

Most mergers will not result in a structural monopoly. Because
mergers occur in a formerly competitive environment, noncompetitive
pricing may result. Higher prices encourage independent firms to remain independent.76 Moreover, as market structure approaches

74. These cost reductions measure the amount of resources that are freed by the efficiency
gains - resources that can be used to produce other goods that will benefit society and, thus,
increase welfare. In contrast to the deadweight loss measured by areas A,, area A2 represents
a real saving of resources for society. These resources are free to produce additional goods in
other, presumably competitive industries.
75. Lande argues that this analysis is insufficient because it does not consider the transfer
of wealth from consumers to producers that results from such a merger. See LANDE, supra
note 10, at 65. Look again at Figure 2. After the merger, consumers must pay P 2 instead of
P, for the Q2 units that they purchase. That is, they must pay an additional (P 2 - P1 )Q2. In
Lande's view, the prevention of such "unjust" transfers was the primary intent of the antitrust
laws.
76. The economic logic is similar to the explanation for cheating in a cartel. See Stigler,
supra note 2.
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monopoly, the antitrust authorities are more likely to challenge any
given merger. 77 Thus, at worst, merger activity is more apt to result
in oligopoly than monopoly. 7s Unfortunately, for purposes of policy
analysis, the economic results of oligopolistic behavior are not as certain as those in competitive or monopolistic markets because the presence of just a few firms leads to strategic behavior on the part of
individual firms. Each firm's behavior is based, in part, on the anticipated reactions of its rivals. In this kind of environment, the results
cannot be known precisely. Nonetheless, collusion and noncompetitive
results are much more likely in markets with fewer participants. 79 The
smaller the number of firms involved, the easier it is to consummate,
implement, and enforce collusive agreements.80
Even if firms do not practice overt collusion in a market where
strategic behavior is possible, tacit understandings may lead to noncompetitive behavior. Further, these tacit forms of collusion can, in
the extreme, lead to monopoly pricing.81 Tacit agreements present
special problems for antitrust enforcement since no formal agreement
exists.
IV.

HOSPITAL MERGERS AND EFFICIENCY

Mergers may increase market power, which tends to decrease consumer welfare. Mergers may also increase efficiency, which tends to
increase consumer welfare. While antitrust authorities are acutely
aware of increases in market power due to mergers, they are less
aware of the efficiencies that may result from such mergers. This
section briefly outlines some of the peculiarities of the health care
market.
Nonprofit hospitals receive certain tax advantages not shared by
for-profit hospitals. In addition, nonprofit hospitals may enjoy favorable merger treatment. The advantages that nonprofit hospitals enjoy

77.

See infra note 116, Justice Dep't Merger Guidelines (June 14, 1984).

78. An oligopoly is an industry dominated by a few large firms.
79. See Hay & Kelley, An Empirical Survey of Price FiXing Conspiracies, 17 J.L. &
ECON. 13 (1974) (for some empirical evidence).
80. See R. BLAIR & L. KENNY, MICROECONOMICS FOR MANAGERIAL DECISIONMAKING
330-37 (1982).
81. See E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 30-55 (8th ed.
1962); see also Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1562 (1969);
Spence, Tacit Coordinationand Imperfect Information, 11 CAN. J. ECON. 490 (1978); Turner,
The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelismand Refusals to
Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962).
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over for-profit hospitals may significantly weaken the competitive
check that the for-profit hospitals provide. Further, nonprofit hospitals
may dissipate these advantages through inefficiency.
A.

The Health Care Market

The health care market has special problems s2 that stem from uncertainty and lack of market information.8 Even with today's extensive
medical knowledge and complex technologies available for treatment,
consumers remain largely ignorant. They have insufficient knowledge
of the symptoms, causes, diagnoses, and treatments to adequately
evaluate the quality of care provided by their physicians and hospitals.
Physicians are ethically bound to provide for the needs of the patient
first,- but even if physicians act in an ethical manner, lack of information renders consumers unable to make informed decisions. Consumers
unable to adequately evaluate the quality of care they receive are
unable to make rational decisions among competing providers based
on price.
While consumer ignorance inhibits competition in health care, thirdparty payment for health care further impedes competition. 85 Even if
consumers have the necessary information to determine the best price,
consumers have no incentive when insurers pay all or a large percentage of the bills. If consumers lack both the ability and the incentive
to evaluate medical procedures and to seek out the best price, insurers
might take on that role. But it would be costly for insurers to gather
full information about the symptoms of patients and arrive at satisfactory diagnoses and treatments that are in accord with those of the
physicians. "To the extent that the insurer defers to the physician's
'discretion' and 'judgment,' he forgoes the role of monitor. " Reviewing
a physician's judgment would be costly indeed, and that cost would
be compounded by the fact that competent physicians may not agree

82. Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry?, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1416
(1980); Frech, Competition in Medical Care: Research and Policy, 5 ADVANCES IN HEALTH
ECON. & HEALTH SERV. RES. 1 (1984) (both provide good summaries of these special problems).
83. See Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON.
REV. 941 (1963); see also Woolley & Frech, How HospitalsCompete: A Review of the Literature,
2 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 57, 59-60 (1988-89) [hereinafter Woolley].
84. The medical malpractice liability crisis, however, is ample proof that this obligation is
not always fulfilled.
85. See Frech, supra note 82; see also Woolley, supra note 83, at 60-61 (discusing results
of empirical studies regarding effects of third-party payments by health insurers).
86. See Clark, supra note 82, at 1421.
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on the relative merits of different treatments. Inadequate information
among consumers and insurers and expert disagreement on the cost-effectiveness of treatments seriously compromise meaningful competition
in health care markets.
B.

Nonprofit Hospitals and Efficiency

If nonprofit hospitals enjoy exemption from section 7 of the Clayton
Act, they can merge despite the merger restrictions on for-profit hospitals. This discrepancy in the hospital industry has serious implications for hospital efficiency. First, if some hospitals can merge while
others cannot, then those which cannot merge will not benefit from
the efficiency inherent in economies of scale. Their costs will be higher
than necessary, resulting in loss of consumer welfare. Second, nonprofit hospitals derive cost advantages not from efficiency differences
but from certain legal advantages nonprofit firms enjoy. Nonprofit
hospitals are accorded favorable tax status at the expense of other
parts of the economy. Since nonprofit hospitals do not labor under the
profit motive, they dissipate their advantages in ways that amount to
a loss of efficiency, thus resulting in consumer welfare losses. Third,
nonprofit hospitals may dissipate their gains from economies of scale
since the for-profit hospitals provide no competitive check. Finally,
even if the law allowed for-profit hospitals to merge, the nonprofit
hospitals are still free to dissipate the advantages associated with their
nonprofit status.
Professor Clark has documented the disparate treatment accorded
to nonprofit hospitals, pointing out that numerous statutes, regulations, and judicial doctrines discriminate against for-profit hospitals.8 7 Nonprofit hospitals are exempt from state and local property
taxes, and the federal government exempts gifts to nonprofit hospitals
from federal income taxes, while gifts to for-profit hospitals are not
exempt. Although the government taxes for-profit hospitals for unemployment compensation according to payroll, it taxes nonprofit hospitals only on actual claims, which is usually a lower amount. For-profit
hospitals can obtain federal grants and federal loans for the development of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) only if they locate
the HMOs in an area that is under-served. In addition, Medicare
reimbursements call for "necessary and proper" costs of rendering
services, which include a fair return on equity. But this requirement
has not been interpreted to include income taxes, and thus the reimbursements result in a lower rate of return when adjusted for taxes.

87.

Id.
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Clark lists a myriad of other ways in which federal policies discriminate
in favor of the nonprofit hospitals.Nonprofit hospitals, then, enjoy a considerable competitive advantage due to these discriminatory policies. In addition, Clark found that
for-profit hospitals are denied cost savings resulting from any
economies of scale that exist - and most would agree that they do
exist. If nonprofit hospitals enjoy cost advantages because of economies
of scale and also because of favorable treatment, one would expect
them to provide services at a lower cost.
Yet, in spite of lower occupancy rates, for-profit hospitals have
lower costs than nonprofit hospitals. This is apparently attributed to
smaller amounts of cost-generating resources and also to shorter
lengths of stay in for-profit hospitals for similar procedures. If forprofit hospitals have these cost disadvantages and still have lower
costs, one would think that patients receive lower quality services in
for-profit hospitals because of less concern for patients and a greater
concern for profits. Empirical evidence, however, shows no differences
in the quality of care provided by for-profit as compared to nonprofit
hospitals. If nonprofit hospitals enjoy cost advantages, but still provide
a similar quality of service while experiencing higher actual costs than
the for-profit hospitals, then they must be less efficient. The reasons
for the relative inefficiency of nonprofit hospitals lie in the very nature
of their nonprofit status and the incentives that that status implies.
Clarkson finds that differences in incentives between nonprofit and
for-profit hospitals have their roots in differences in property rights
invested in owners and managers. 89 These differences in incentives,
in turn, lead to differences in efficiency. In the case of for-profit
hospitals, the owners or trustees have exclusive rights to all benefits,
pecuniary and nonpecuniary, derived from the production of hospital
services. They impose on their managers rules and regulations designed to maximize those benefits. Managers are often afforded partial
ownership rights in order to insure that they share similar goals with
the owners. Managers directly rewarded by increases in profits and
capital values have a direct stake in the efficiency with which the
for-profit hospital provides services.
The trustees of nonproprietary hospitals, on the other hand, do
not have exclusive rights to these pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits.
Since they do not have these rights, they cannot assign them to managers in order to provide them with incentives to maximize the firm's

88. Id.
89. Clarkson, Some Implications of Property Rights in Hospital Management, 15 J.L. &
ECON. 363 (1972).
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wealth. Consequently, managers of nonprofit hospitals have a greatly
reduced link between their own welfare and the wealth of the hospital.
Accordingly, they have less interest in enhancing efficiency than the
for-profit hospital manager and, predictably, managerial slack is
greater in nonprofit hospitals. This managerial slack results in less
rigorous supervision of employees, hiring on the basis of academic
credentials rather than on harder-to-obtain indications of performance
ability, a wider variance in input selection among nonprofit hospitals
since input selection is more constrained by market forces in the case
of for-profit hospitals, a less intense effort to collect bad debts because
of less pressure to increase revenues, and less price consciousness in
their purchasing efforts9
Managerial slack may dissipate any cost advantages that accrue to
the nonprofit hospitals, advantages that for-profit hospitals would seek
to extract in the form of current income and increased value of the
firm. While enhanced by a system of third party payments and the
information problems in health care noted above, the ability of nonprofit hospitals to survive managerial inefficiencies may also lie in the
lack of competition from the for-profit hospitals.
V.

ANTITRUST TREATMENT OF HOSPITAL MERGERS

The Clayton Act forbids mergers that may substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly.91 That is, it proscribes
mergers that would enhance market power in a significant way.- The
Clayton Act defines a market as "any line of commerce . . . in any
section of the country. '"- This, as noted above, makes it necessary to
establish a product market as well as a geographic market in which
to assess market power. This section looks first at product market
then geographic market as defined by both the courts and the Justice
Department. After establishing the relevant market, the regulator
must determine whether a proposed merger may substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly.
A.

The Product Market

The extent of a product market is defined by the degree to which
products are substitutes for one another. If guod product substitutes
exist, then the propensity of a producer's customers to switch to
another product limits the producer's ability to raise prices.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 364-67.
15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (West 1988).
See supra notes 6-9.
15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (West 1988).

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 2

The Supreme Court recognized this approach in Brown Shoe Co.when it mentioned both the "reasonable interchangeability of use" and
the "cross-elasticity of demand" while discussing product markets. 95
Cross-elasticity of demand measures the degree to which the producer
is limited in its ability to raise price by the propensity of its customers
to switch to other products when faced with price increases. 9 If a
small percentage increase in price by a producer results in the defection
of a large percentage of its customers to competing products, then
the competing products are good substitutes. The existence of competing products inhibits the ability of the producer to raise prices, and
for purposes of measuring market power, the product definition should
include these products. If, on the other hand, price increases do not
bring about significant defections, then the products are not good
substitutes and are not in the same product market. While the Court
has stated that reasonable interchangeability and cross-elasticity of
demand are important measures for determining the product market,
it has not relied heavily on such evidence.Bank merger cases have influenced hospital merger cases because
of the similarities between the banking and hospital industries: both
are regulated, both are service industries, and both provide a "cluster
of services." In United States v. PhiladelphiaNational Bank, Inc.,
the Supreme Court first introduced the "cluster of services" concept
with reference to commercial banking. 9s In United States v. Marine
Bancorporation,Inc., the Court reinforced the concept of "commercial
banking business."
In In re American Medical International, the FTC adopted the
"cluster of services approach" in deciding a hospital merger case. 1°°
American Medical International (AMI) acquired French Hospital and
thereby gained control of three of the five hospitals in San Luis Obispo,
California and eighty percent of the acute-care beds. 101
Arguing that
the product market should include services offered by non-hospital

94. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
95. Id. at 325.
96. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
97. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Rome Cable), 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
98. 374 U.S. 321, 356 (1963). Banks provide a variety of services such as checking accounts,
loans, and ATMs that are also provided by other financial institutions. These could each be
viewed as a separate service, subject to significant competition from savings and loans. But if
only commercial banks provide the entire package, the whole "cluster of services," then they
are effectively shielded from competition from those that provide only parts of the cluster.
99. 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
100. 104 F.T.C. 1, 177 (1984).
101. Id. at 3.
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providers, AMI contended that if it raised prices for its services,
customers would be free to obtain these services from non-hospital
providers. Since reasonable interchangeability existed, AMI asserted
that the non-hospital providers should be included in the product market. 10 2 The FTC stated, however, that the unique "cluster of services"
provided by an acute care hospital was analogous to those described
in PhiladelphiaNationalBank 103 and that reasonable interchangeability did not exist.-°
The FTC in American Medical Internationalconcluded that the
cluster of services provided by general acute care hospitals is a unique
package of services.10 5 These services are complementary in providing
health care since many patients need an array of services that usually
are available together only in a general acute care hospital. In addition,
those in the hospital business recognize only other hospitals as competitors. 106
The court in Hospital Corporation of America v. Federal Trade
Commission reinforced the cluster of services approach. 1°7 Hospital
Corporation of America (HCA), the largest hospital chain in the United
States, took control of several hospitals in the Chattanooga, Tennessee
area. 108 Because the administrative law judge applied the "cluster of
services" doctrine, the court excluded outpatient facilities or providers
in the market definition but included all outpatient services.9 The
FTC noted, however, that inpatient hospital services may be the correct product market.110 While these inpatient hospital services were
not a factor in Hospital Corporationof America, they may well influence the shape of product markets in future cases. Two recent district
court decisions are in conflict on this point. In United States v.
Rockford Memorial Corp.,, the court defined the market as acute
inpatient services, thereby excluding outpatient facilities. 1 2 In contrast, the district court in United States v. CarilionHealth System'

102. Id. at 192. It is, of course, in the defendants' interest to include as many providers
as possible in the product market, thus diluting the defendants' market share.
103. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
104. In re American Medical Int'l, Inc., 104 F.T.C. 1, 193-94 (1984).
105. Id. at 194.
106. Id.
107. 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987).
108. Id. at 1383.
109. Id. at 1384.
110. Id. at 1384-85.
111. 717 F. Supp. 1251 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
112. Id. at 1259-60.
113. 707 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Va. 1989).
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defined the market to include outpatient facilities.114 The Supreme
Court has yet to resolve the issue of relevant product market definition
in hospital merger cases.
B.

Department of Justice Guidelines

To improve the predictability of its merger enforcement policy,116
the United States Department of Justice (Department) published new
merger guidelines in 1984.116 The guidelines' approach to determining
the product market involves a hypothetical firm that enjoys a monopoly
position in each (narrowly-defined) product produced or sold by the
merging firms.11 7 The Department then asks what would happen if the
monopolist imposed a "small but significant and nontransitory" price
increase. I s If the price increase causes so many buyers to shift to
substitute products that such a price change is not profitable, the
Department will add to the product group the product that is the next
best substitute for the merging firm's product." 9 The same inquiry is
repeated until a group of products is identified for which a hypothetical
monopolist could impose a "small but significant and nontransitory"
price increase which results in increased profits.120 In most cases, the
relevant product market will consist of the smallest group of products
that satisfies this test. In determining product substitutability, the
Department will give particular weight to the following types of evidence: 1) a buyer's perceptions that the goods are substitutes, 2)
similarities or differences in price movements over a period of years
unexplained by other factors, 3) similarities or differences in customary
usage, 4) design, physical composition and other technical characteristics, and 5) evidence of sellers' perceptions that the products are or
2
are not substitutes.' '
The guidelines' approach may undermine the "cluster of services"
approach to product market determination. 12 By examining each service individually and trying to determine its substitutes, the Depart-

114. Id. at 847-48.
115. See Blair & Kaserman, supra note 45, at 246-49.
116. 1984 U.S. Justice Department Merger Guidelines, Antitrust Trade Reg. Rep., Special
Supp. §§ 1-16 (June 14, 1984).
117. Id. § 2.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Blair & Kaserman, supra note 45, at 247.
122. See Cruz, Productand GeographicalMarket Measures in the Merger of Hospitals, 91
DICK. L. REV. 497 (1988).
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ment invites the hospitals to argue that non-hospital providers should
be included in the market definition. But even if courts accept hospital
arguments that the guidelines supersede the "cluster" approach, the
Department could still argue that the "cluster of services" is a unique
product and that the non-hospital services are not a good substitute. 123
C.

The Geographic Market

After establishing the product market, the next step is to determine
the relevant geographic market. The FTC uses several factors to
analyze the geographic market in hospital merger cases. 12 One factor
is the immigration and emigration of patients. 12 Starting with the
location of the merging hospital, patient origin studies determine the
percentage of patients within the hospital's primary and secondary
service area who use services offered by providers outside the area.
Similarly, the relative importance of patients from outside the primary
and secondary service areas is examined. If the percentages of these
inflows and outflows are low, then the area is probably the relevant
geographic market. If they are high, then the market area should
probably be larger.126 Since one cannot specify precisely what constitutes "low" and "high" in this determination, some arbitrariness is
unfortunately inevitable.
Physicians' location is another factor in determining the relevant
geographic market. Because of the consumer's lack of information, the
physician usually makes, or greatly influences, the decision concerning
where to go for hospital services. Consequently, hospitals "compete
for physicians in order to increase admissions." 12 Further, since most
physicians refer patients to hospitals located near their offices, the
area in which physicians are concentrated is an important determinant
of the appropriate geographic market.'- A final factor is the geographic
area that the hospital administrators themselves recognize as the relevant one.
The market for acute care hospital services tends to be local in
character since both patients and physicians prefer hospitals that are
convenient. The judiciary has recognized what may seem intuitively

123. Id. at 521.
124. Id. at 521-26 (for an analysis of these factors).
125. See In re American Medical Int'l, Inc., 104 F.T.C. 1 (1984); Hospital Corp. of Am. v.
Federal Trade Comm'n, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987).
126. Elzinga & Hogarty, The Problem of GeographicalMarket Delineation in Antimerger
Suits, 18 ANTITRUST BULL. 45 (1973).
127. In re American Medical Int'l, Inc., 104 F.T.C. at 197.
128. See Cruz, supra note 122, at 524.
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obvious: patients go to local hospitals except for highly specialized
medical services. For example, in In re American Medical International, the city of San Luis Obispo as well as San Luis Obispo County
were relevant geographic markets.'- The court in American Medicorp
v. Humana, Inc. found that the relevant geographic market was "in
' 13
and around Bluefield, West Virginia.' 0
The Department of Justice Guidelines seek to identify a geographic
area in which a hypothetical firm, as the only present and future
producer or seller of the relevant product in the area, could profitably31
impose a "small but significant and nontransitory" increase in price.1
The Department begins at the geographic location of each merging
firm and considers what would happen if the hypothetical monopolist
imposed such a price increase.- 82 If so many buyers would switch to
products produced in other geographic areas that the hypothetical
monopolist would find the price increase unprofitable, the Department
will add the location providing the next best substitute products and
ask the same hypothetical question again.- This process is repeated
until the monopolist is able to profitably impose such an increase in
price.- The smallest market in which this can occur is the relevant
geographic market.In determining geographic substitutability, the Department gives
particular weight to the following: shipping patterns of the merging
firm and its competitors; evidence that buyers actually consider shifting purchases, especially in response to price changes; differences or
similarities in price changes for the product that are not explained by
other factors; transportation costs; costs of local distribution; and excess capacity of firms outside the location of the merging firms.' 36
M

D.

Anticompetitive Effect

After defining the product and geographic markets, courts determine whether a proposed merger will substantially lessen competition.
In United States v. Columbia Steel Co., s7 the Supreme Court deter-

129. In re American Medical Int'l, Inc., 104 F.T.C. at 187.
130. American Medicorp, Inc. v. Humana, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 573, 605 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
131. 1984 U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, Justice Dep't Merger Guidelines,
Antitrust Trade Reg. Rep., Special Supp. at §§ 1-16, 3, 2.31 (June 14, 1984).
132. Id.
133. Id.

134.

Id.

135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id. § 2.32.
334 U.S. 495 (1948).
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mined that the anticompetitive effect of a merger hinges on the market
shares involved. Although market shares have been important at least
since that landmark 1948 decision, the importance of market shares
increased dramatically following the Cellar-Kefauver Amendment to
section 7 of the Clayton Act in 1950.1The Court prefaced its Brown Shoe decision with a review of the
factors instrumental in the passing of the Cellar-Kefauver Amendment. 139 Among those factors was Congress' desire to provide the
power to halt a merger trend.1- Congress also wanted to provide a
lower standard of proof than that demanded by the Sherman Act to
make it easier for the government to prevail in court. 141 While noting
that Congress proposed no tests for defining either the "relevant markets" or "substantially lessened competition," the Court declared that
Congress had intended that a merger be viewed functionally in the
context of the relevant industry. 42 Finally, the Court noted that the
language of section 7 clearly concerns the probabilities of concentration
rather than with its certainties.'4
Although the Court in Brown Shoe Co. found that the merger of
the manufacturing facilities involved was too insignificant to come
under section 7, it found that the merger of the shoe manufacturer
with another shoe retailer did come under section 7.1- Focusing on
the market share of the merged firms, which is "one of the most
important factors when determining the probable effects ... on effective competition in the relevant market,' ' 1 5 the Court found that a
five percent share was important in a fragmented market.146 Further,
it went on to find that a small share takes on greater significance if
the retail outlet is a part of a national chain. 147 What transforms a
small share into a significant one, however, is not clear.
Although the shoe retailing industry was not concentrated, the
Court noted a historical tendency toward concentration in the industry
through merger.1 4s Admittedly, this merger did not involve huge mar138. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1950).
139. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315-23 (1962).
140. Id. at 315.
141. Id. at 318.
142. Id. at 320-22.
143. Id. at 323.
144. Id. The Court explained that the merger of the fourth largest shoe manufacturer with
the largest shoe retailer could result in a large potential market foreclosure and that this vertical
merger would be analogous to a tying arrangement.
145. Id. at 343.
146. Id. at 343-44.
147. Id. at 343.
148. Id. at 345.
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ket shares. Nevertheless, the Court feared a domino effect of having
49
to approve other mergers in the industry if it approved this merger. 1
Consequently, it ruled against Brown Shoe: "[w]e cannot avoid the
mandate of Congress that tendencies toward concentration in industry
are to be curbed in their incipiency."','
The Court also focused on market share in United States v.
PhiladelphiaNational Bank.5 1 The Philadelphia National Bank, second largest commercial bank in the Philadelphia area, merged with
the third largest commercial bank of the forty-two commercial banks
in the four-county area around Philadelphia. 152 The newly merged firm
would have been the largest in the area with a market share of thirtyfour percent to thirty-six percent." The Court declined to conduct
any economic analysis. Noting that Congress was concerned about a
rising tide of concentration in the economy, the Court said,
This intense congressional concern with the trend toward
concentration warrants dispensing, in certain cases, with
elaborate proof of market structure, market-behavior, or
probable anticompetitive effects. Specifically, we think that
a merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and results in a significant
increase in the concentration of firms in that market, is so
inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it
must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing
the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects. 154
Incredibly, the Court felt that this "test is fully consonant with
economic theory.' 155 Philadelphia National Bank tried to argue that a
larger bank in Philadelphia would bring business to the area and
stimulate its economic development, but the Court rejected that argument: "[w]e are clear . . . that a merger the effect of which may be
substantially to lessen competition is not saved because, on some ul-

149. Id. at 344.
150. Id. at 346.
151. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
152. Id. at 330.
153. Id. at 331.
154. Id. at 363.
155. Id. The Court assumed that "competition is likely to be the greatest when there are many
sellers, none of which has any significant market share." Id. (citing Comment, Current Problems
of Horizontal Mergers, 68 YALE L.J. 1627, 1638-39 (1959)).
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timate reckoning or social or economic debits and credits, it may be
deemed beneficial. '' 156 So much for social welfare.
E.

Market Analysis in Hospital Merger Cases
1. Price Competition

Because of the prevalence of third-party payment and cost-based
reimbursement, one may argue that consumers are not sensitive to
price differences among hospitals. 157If hospitals do not benefit from
price competition, no price competition will exist among them. In the
absence of price competition, no market mechanism exists to discipline
the hospitals' price and quality of care decisions. Thus, there would
be no need for traditional antitrust concerns regarding mergers in
concentrated markets. But the courts, in attempting to protect whatever competition exists in the hospital industry, have rejected this
logic.
Price competition does exist in the hospital industry. In American
Medical International,the court found that "price competition clearly
existed between French [hospital] and Sierra Vista [hospital] with
regard to ... room rates, operating room rates and emergency room
rates." '1 For example, French Hospital waived its usual emergencyroom fee during non-peak hours. 159 This practice obviously benefits
consumers who do not have insurance and those who must make copayments. Less obviously perhaps, reduced claims will benefit everyone
with health insurance because lower claims mean lower costs to the
insurer which, in turn, will mean lower insurance premiums. -

156. Id. at 371. The logic of Philadelphia Nat'l Bank was applied in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271 (1964), and in United States v. Continental Can Co., 378
U.S. 441 (1964). In both cases, the government presented some market share data, and the
Court ruled in its favor without any economic analysis. In Continental Can, the Court observed
that "[w]here a merger is of such size as to be inherently suspect, elaborate proof of market
structure, market behavior and probable anticompetitive effects may be dispensed with in view
of § 7's design to prevent undue concentration." 378 U.S. at 458.
157. In fact, AMI made a similar argument. See Respondent's Brief on Appeal from Initial
Decision at 6-21 and 43-51.
158. In re American Medical Int'l, Inc., 104 F.T.C. 1 (1984).
159. Id. at 203.
160. Hospital Corp. of Am. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987). The decision recognized that there had been little price competition
among acute care hospitals, but whatever price competition existed should be protected.
Moreover, changes in the array of health care consumers (HMOs and PPOs) may serve to
increase price competition. Thus, the possibility of price competition should be preserved.
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Market Concentration

Measures of market concentration -

the traditional concentration

ratio or the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index - cannot be dispositive in
an economic analysis of mergers. 161 Concentration is only one of the
relevant factors. It is also necessary to consider the supply offered
by actual and potential competitors as well as the share commanded
by the merged firm. In the hospital industry, the supply offered by
rival hospitals may be quite large since many hospitals have excess
capacity (i.e., a low utilization or occupancy rate). Where excess capacity does not exist, however, the supply response may be close to zero
since the certificate-of-need (CON) requirements pose an almost insurmountable entry barrier.
Ordinarily, poor economic performance - excessive prices, low
quality, poor service - provides an incentive for outsiders to enter
or current rivals to expand. In the hospital industry, however, the
expansion of supply is controlled by CON determinations. Adding beds
in an existing hospital or the construction of a new hospital requires
a CON. Without the CON, the state forbids entry. Whenever a hospital
requests de novo entry or expansion, hearings are held and the existing
hospitals can intervene to oppose the new entry. Generally, the new
entrant cannot use opportunity for greater profit as a basis for establishing the need for additional capacity. As long as there is sufficient
capacity to handle the case load, the state will not permit new entry.
that CON
In the hospital merger cases, the courts have recognized
162
requirements have posed very high entry barriers.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Hospital mergers may pose the same sorts of competitive risks
that other mergers pose. To the extent that the market structure
becomes less competitive, one may argue that mergers may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. When hospital
mergers fall short of monopoly, the greatest competitive danger is
that the remaining hospitals will collude. Since hospitals have banded
together historically to solve joint problems, this danger is quite real.
Some hospitals have exchanged wage and price data'- and entered

161. See Landes & Posner, supra note 1.
162. See also In re American Medical Int'l, 104 F.T.C. 1 (1984) (market allocation agreement
is suspect); see generally Gross, Certificate of Need: Background and Review of Recent Changes
in Florida'sLaw, 2 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 183 (1988-89).

163. Exchanges of price data tend to be suspect. See United States v. Container Corp. of
Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978).

1988-1989]

ANTITRUST TREATMENT OF HOSPITAL MERGERS

55

into anticompetitive market allocation agreements.'" Moreover, hospital administrators have often joined forces in opposing CON applications of other hospitals. 165 Thus, it is appropriate for the antitrust
authorities to remain vigilant. - Hospital competition can be beneficial
and should be preserved and protected.

164. These are also suspect. See United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
165. This behavior is protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United Mine Workers of
Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). The doctrine permits joint efforts to petition a government agency.
166. There is some evidence that the Department of Justice has maintained its vigilance.
It has challenged two hospital mergers: United States v. Carillon Health Sys., 707 F. Supp.
840 (W.D. Va. 1989), which it lost, and United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 717 F.
Supp. 1251 (N.D. Ill. 1989), which it won.

